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MORE'S THE PITY: PA TMORE V TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL
AND THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OVER NORTH
CAROLINA JUDICIAL CONSTRUAL OF LOCAL
AUTHORITY
HEYWARD EARNHARDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The local governments of North Carolina are responsible for their unique
geographical areas, and as such, these governments have the broad authori-
ty to enact ordinances for the public good ... until they do not. The ques-
tion of how far the ordinances of local governments in North Carolina can
veer from the strict letter of law as written by the General Assembly has
been a difficult one to answer since the formation of the state. If the polar
opposites in construing local authority are broad and narrow interpretations,
then the pendulum has experienced a roaming traverse between the two that
continues to this day.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently faced this issue in Pat-
more v. Town of Chapel Hill.' The court upheld a Chapel Hill ordinance
that allowed Chapel Hill to fine a district's property owners when more
than four cars were parked on a property, regardless of whether the property
was inhabited by owners or renters.2 The court attempted to distinguish the
case from the recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Lanvale
Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus,3 a case that raised questions about
the limits of local government authority.4
* B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, History, 2010; J.D. candidate, North Caroli-
na Central University School of Law, 2016.
1. 757 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
2. Id. at 304, 309
3. 731 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. 2012).
4. See Frayda S. Bluestein, Is North Carolina a Dillon's Rule State?, COATES' CANONS: NC
LOCAL Gov'T LAW (Oct. 2 7th, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.cdu/?p=6894 ("The most recent North
Carolina Supreme Court case addressing this subject, however, gives me pause."); C. Tyler Mulligan,
Economic Development Incentives and North Carolina Local Governments: A Framework For Analysis,
91 N.C. L. REV. 2021, 2029 (2013) ("[Rlccent court decisions have created uncertainty about the role of
the broad construction statutes."); Bradley D. Harder, Note, Reattaching the Severance Argument to
216
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This case note will examine the current state of North Carolina's case
law regarding judicial construal of the extent and boundaries of local gov-
ernment authority. This note will also critique the holding in Patmore v.
Town of Chapel Hill. Finally, this note will compare the ordinances at issue
in Patmore and Lanvale and discuss the implications of the respective deci-
sions.
II. THE CASE
Patmore arises out of the Town of Chapel Hill's adoption of an amend-
ment to its municipal zoning ordinance.5 When the zoning ordinance was
enacted, the ordinance created multiple zoning districts including a residen-
tial area close to UNC-Chapel Hill's campus known as the Northside
Neighborhood Conservation District (NNC district).6 Due to the NNC dis-
trict's close proximity to the University, it is common for students to rent
property and reside in the district.7 Not surprisingly, for several years the
district experienced a problem with over-occupancy, or "rental to a greater
number of tenants than bedrooms." 8 In addition to safety concerns, over-
occupancy was linked to other community problems such as increased noise
complaints, garbage overflow, traffic and parking congestion, and cars
parked on front lawns.9
Since the zoning ordinance's existing design standards governing the
NNC district were not adequately combating the problem of over-
occupancy, Chapel Hill sought other means of addressing the problem.10
Chapel Hill's planning department decided that the number of cars parked
on a property provided a reasonable estimate of the number of the proper-
ty's tenants." Thus, following a public hearing on the matter, Chapel Hill's
Town Council adopted an amendment to the zoning ordinance on January
9, 2012 that restricted the number of parked vehicles allowable on a resi-
dential property in the NNC district to four vehicles.1 2 When a rented prop-
Lanvale Properties: Counties' Authority to Impose Non-Monetary Conditions on Housing Develop-
ments Affecting School Capacity, 92 N.C. L. REV. Addendum 120 (2014), http://nclawrevicw.org/
documents/92/Addendum/hardcr.pdf ("But Lanvale Properties marks the second time that the court has
avoided the rule's interpretive mandate and it increases existing confusion about the rule's applica-
tion.").
5. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d 303.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief of Defendant-Appellec at 3-4, Patmore v. Town of Chapel Hill, 757 S.E.2d 302 (N.C.
2014) (No. COAI 3-1049), 2013 WL 6516982.
10. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d at 303.
11. Id.
12. Id.
2015]) 217
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erty is in violation of the regulation, the property owner, rather than the
tenants, is cited for the violation. 3
After the amendment took effect on September 1, 2012, the plain-
tiffs, both property owners in the NNC district, were cited for violations of
the regulation committed by their tenants.1 4 Accordingly, on November 27,
2012 the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to have the amendment de-
clared void as ultra vires and to prevent enforcement on the grounds that
the amendment violated due process. 1 After the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint on December 7, 2012, both the plaintiffs and the defendant, the
Town of Chapel Hill, filed cross-motions for summary judgment in May
2013.16 The trial court heard those motions on June 3, 2013, and granted
summary judgment in favor of Chapel Hill.17 The plaintiffs subsequently
appealed. '
At the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs put forth three main arguments.19
In their third argument, the plaintiffs contended that under the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court's recent decision in Lanvale, Chapel Hill was not au-
thorized by their general zoning power to enact the zoning amendment at
issue in the case. 20 The Court of Appeals adopted a particular interpretation
of Lanvale, holding that the Supreme Court's holding invalidated the in-
stant ordinance there solely because it was not technically a zoning ordi-
nance. 2 1 The Court of Appeals held that because Lanvale did not actually
address local authority to enact valid zoning ordinances, Lanvale was not
applicable and could not invalidate the zoning amendment at issue in the
22
case.
After the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on
April 1, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a petition for discretionary review to the
Supreme Court. 2 3 However, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' peti-
24tion.
13. Id.
14. Id.
i5. Id. at 303-04.
i6. Id. at 304.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 304, 306, 308 (arguing first that the amendment violates substantive due process under
Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, and second that the amendment is unauthorized
by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-301 under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius).
20. Id. at 308.
21. Id. at 308-09.
22. Id.
23. Patmore v. Town of Chapel Hill, N.C., 757 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
24. Id.
3
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HI. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution, while providing a framework for the re-
spective powers of the federal and state governments, does not explicitly
provide for the creation of local governments or establish the powers that
local governments may exercise.2 5 Because local governments are, in effect,
"agencies" or "political subdivisions" of the states, they have no inherent
powers and derive all authority from the constitutions and legislatures of
their respective states.26 Thus, a state legislature has complete discretion to
expand or limit the powers delegated to its local governments provided that
the state legislature acts in conformity with its state constitution.27 Within
this framework, states can decide how broadly or narrowly the explicit con-
stitutional and legislative grants of authority to local governments should be
construed.28
Predictably, the authority delegated to state governments and the manner
in which such grants are construed differ from state to state.29 While states
are often classified as being either a "home rule" or a "Dillon's Rule" state,
these designations can be misleading.30 Home rule is associated with a
broad delegation of authority to local governments, and essentially means
that a local government has authority over a local matter unless explicitly
preempted by state statute. Without home rule, a state does not have au-
thority over a local matter unless authorized by state statute.32 Dillon's Rule
is not actually the opposite of home rule, but rather a rule of statutory con-
struction. Dillon's Rule means that a municipality can exercise only those
powers "granted in express words," "necessarily or fairly implied in or in-
cident to the powers expressly granted," and "essential to the declared ob-
25. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 72 POPULAR
Gov'T 15 (2006), http://sogpubs.unc.cdu/clectronicvcrsions/pg/pgfal06/articlc2.pdf.
26. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); Bluestcin, supra note 25, at 16.
27. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178
28. See Bluestein, supra note 25, at 17 ("Some states have enacted constitutional or statutory
provisions that specify the appropriate standard for reviewing the scope of authority granted.").
29. Id. at 16-17 (discussing differences between states which employ "home rule").
30. See JESSE J. RICHARDSON JR. ET AL., IS HOME RULE THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE
INFLUENCE OF DILLON'S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 7 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Inst.,
2003), available at www.brookings.edules/urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf ("And yet, Dillon's Rule
and home rule states are not polar opposites. No state reserves all power to itself, and none devolves all
of its authority to localities."); Bluestein, supra note 25, at 17 ("Although the prevailing notion is that
states have either home rule or Dillon's rule, courts in home rule states sometimes use Dillon's rule to
interpret the scope of local government authority .... The presence of home rule authority, however,
has not consistently guaranteed deferential review of local authority by the courts.").
31. Bluestein, supra note 25, at 16.
32. Id.
33. RICHARDSON JR. ET AL., supra note 30, at 7; Bluestein, supra note 25, at 15.
2015] 219
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jects and purposes of the [municipal] corporation."3 4 States with Dillon's
rule are associated with a narrow judicial construction of local government
authority.
While North Carolina does not have home rule, the state's approach to
judicial interpretation of authority granted to local governments has
changed over time. While there are not many reported decisions regarding
local authority prior to the 1870s, the general approach in North Carolina
favored a broad construal of local authority during that era.3 8 However,
North Carolina adopted the narrow construction of Dillon's Rule in the
1870s.39 This adherence to Dillon's Rule continued for about 100 years
until the General Assembly adopted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4 (governing
municipalities) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153-4 (governing counties) (the
"broad construction statutes").4 0 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4 provides:
It is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State
should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, func-
tions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end,
the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly construed
and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are rea-
sonably expedient to the exercise of the power.41
In addition, the General Assembly adopted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-177
(governing municipalities) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-124 (governing
counties), which provide that any enumeration of powers in these chapters
would not be exclusive nor would it limit a local government's general au-
thority to enact ordinances.42 Unfortunately, following the adoption of these
statutes, courts have failed to uniformly apply these directives.43
34. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101-102 (Chicago,
James Cockcroft & Co. 1872).
35. See Bluestein, supra note 4, at 15 (when used to describe a state, it usually means that local
powers are interpreted narrowly in the absence of a legislative directive for a broad interpretation.)
36. Bluestein, supra note 4 ("North Carolina is neither a Dillon's Rule state nor a home rule
state.").
37. See Lanvale Properties, LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 731 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. 2012). ("This Court's
general approach to construing the legislative authority of local governments has evolved over time.").
38. See David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671, 680 n. 47 (2000) ("The few early North Carolina decisions addressing the
scope of local authority applied a broad reading to legislative grants of municipal authority.").
39. Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d at 809("[i]n the 1870s this Court adopted a more restrictive approach
known as "Dillon's Rule.").
40. Id.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2013).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-177 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-124 (2013) ("The enumeration
in this Article or other portions of this Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate
acts, omissions, or conditions is not exclusive, nor is it a limit on the general authority to adopt ordi-
nances conferred on counties by G.S. 153A-12 .").
43. See Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d at 809 ("Our initial application of these provisions to zoning cases
was inconsistent.").
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Despite the straightforward language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4 and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153-4, which mandates broad construction, state courts, at
times, continued to use Dillon's Rule in construing local government au-
thority." In 1994, the Supreme Court seemingly settled the issue in Home-
builders Ass'n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte,45 holding that, "[t]he
proper rule of construction is the one set forth in [N.C.G.S. § 160A-4]."
Yet, five years later in Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City ofDurham, the
Supreme Court ignored the statutory broad construction mandate in favor of
a narrow construction.4 ' The Court held that "[w]hen the language of a stat-
ute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and
the courts must give [the statute] its plain and definite meaning."" Notably,
the majority in Smith Chapel failed to mention N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4,
and earned a thorough rebuke from the dissenting justices. 49 Amidst the
backdrop of this continuing inconsistency came the 2012 decision in Lan-
vale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus.50
Lanvale arose from the County of Cabarrus' adoption of an adequate
public facilities ordinance (APFO).5' The APFO conditioned "approval of
new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsi-
dize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's pub-
lic schools."52 The plaintiff, a developer in the County, challenged the ordi-
nance on the grounds that the County did not have the authority under its
general zoning powers to enact such an ordinance. Ultimately, the North
44. See Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 276 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. 1981) (applying
Dillon's Rule in holding that the city was not authorized to exercise discretion in accepting bids for real
estate). See also Bluestcin, supra note 25, at 19 ("Despite this directive, North Carolina courts have
continued intermittently to apply Dillon's rule ... even though the rule appears to be entirely incon-
sistent with the more generous standard in the statute. As shown in a recent comprehensive analysis of
Dillon's rule in North Carolina, the record of cases is quite mixed.").
45. 442 S.E.2d 45, (N.C. 1994).
46. Id. at 50 ("This statute makes it clear that the provisions of chapter 160A and of city charters
shall be broadly construed and that grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and
supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and
effect. We treat this language as a 'legislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad fashion the
provisions and grants of power contained in Chapter 160A."') (quoting River Birch Associates v. City
of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 543 (N.C. 1990)).
47. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. 1999) (holding that
Durham exceeded its authority in imposing fees for stormwater utility programs).
48. Id. at 878.
49. Id. at 883 (Frye, J., dissenting) ("N.C.G.S. § 160A-4 and Homebuilders Assn of Charlotte
require us to interpret the applicable public enterprise statutes broadly enough to encompass the City's
operation of its SWU and collection of fees.")
50. Lanvale Properties, LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 731 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. 2012).
51. Id. at 803.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and held the APFO to be
invalid.54
The Court issued an extensive opinion that touched on many argu-
ments.55 After adopting a narrow reading of the definition of zoning, part of
the Court's holding was based on its conclusion that the APFO did not
technically qualify as a zoning ordinance.5 6 The Court held Cabarrus Coun-
ty's APFO did not adequately and explicitly divide the county's territory
into districts before regulating land use activities within such districts.57
Additionally, the Court held that the fees imposed by the county on devel-
opers to fund schools were the same type of mandatory "impact fees" that
the N.C. Court of Appeals previously struck down on two occasions.58 The
Court pointed out that where the General Assembly had explicitly author-
ized Orange and Chatham Counties to enact impacts fees, while thrice
denying Union County's requests for such authority, the General Assembly
had indicated legislative intent for that authority to be excluded from local
governments' general grants of power.59 The Court further held that the
APFO interfered with the state's extant system for educational funding.6 0
A vast portion of the holding in Lanvale was dedicated to judicial inter-
pretation of local authority.6 ' The County contended that it was authorized
to enact its APFO under the county's general zoning powers granted by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-121(a), and more specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. §
153A-340(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-341.62 While these statutes do not
explicitly authorize APFOs, the County argued that in conjunction with the
broad construction mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4 (and § 153A-124),
the County had implicit authorization under the statutes to enact the
APFO.63 The Court adopted an interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4
where it applied "only when our zoning statutes are ambiguous ... or when
its application is necessary to give effect to 'any powers that are reasonably
expedient to [a county's] exercise of the power.'"4 Holding that the lan-
54. Id. at 807.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 811-13.
57. Id. at 813-14.
58. Id. at 814.
59. Id. at 814-16.
60. Id. at 814.
61. Id.at81l-13.
62. Id. at 808.
63. Id. at 808-810.
64. Id. at 810 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2013)).
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guage of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(a) and § 153A-341 was unambiguous,
the Court declined to apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4.s
Regarding the second prong of the Court's professed test for N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 153A-4, the Court curiously reduced its analysis of whether the
APFO was a "reasonably expedient" means of exercising county power to a
single footnote commenting on the increasing cost of fees that resulted from
the APFO.66 For these reasons, the Court held that the County did not have
the authority to enact its APFO.6 7 The Court may have dedicated so little of
its opinion to this aspect of the holding in response to a robust dissenting
opinion arguing for the Homebuilders approach to judicial interpretation of
local authority.68
Faced with a choice between following Homebuilders or Smith Chapel,
the Court decided, once and for all, that Smith Chapel was the controlling
law.69 Smith Chapel failed to mention the broad construction statutes, and
espoused an approach seemingly contradictory to the stated intent of the
General Assembly in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-
4.70 However, in Lanvale, the Court confirmed that the general approach in
Smith Chapel was controlling in North Carolina, and explicitly provided the
analysis courts should use in construing the State's grant of authority to
local governments.7 ' Rather than putting an end to the uncertainty in this
aspect of the judicial process, the complexity and breadth of Lanvale has
raised more questions. 72 As Professor Frayda Bluestein from the North Car-
olina School of Government commented:
The potential impact of the decision is quite broad . . .. [T]he decision's
narrow reading of powers that might be implicit in the zoning laws may
call into question numerous regulations that are not explicitly outlined in
65. Id. ("Sections 153A-340(a) andl53A-341 express in unambiguous language the General
Assembly's intent to delegate gencral zoning powers to county governments. Thus, section 153A-4 is
inapposite in the instant case.")
66. Id.at8lOn.8.
67. Id at 810.
68. Id. at 818-28 (Hudson, J., dissenting) ("The majority's opinion minimizes the expansive
powers that the General Assembly has given countics to oversee and control development and school
construction. The opinion overlooks the clear language of the Gencral Statutes in Chapter 153A.").
69. Id. at 811 (majority opinion) ("[T]he dissent attempts to brush aside our decision in Smith
Chapel by referring to the dissenting opinion in that case. Interestingly enough, Homebuilders also
featured a dissenting opinion.... But the existence of a dissenting opinion in our decisions does not
undermine the decision's status as binding precedent. The statutes at issue here- section 153A-340(a)
and 153A-341 - are clear and unambiguous articulations of county zoning powers. As a result, Smith
Chapel governs this case no matter how much the dissent wishes otherwise.").
70. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. 1999).
71. Lanvale Properties, LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 731 S.E.2d 800, 811 (N.C. 2012).
72. See Bluestein,supra note 4.
2015] 223
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the laws themselves, but are commonly recognized as being within the
legislative intent for land use regulation by local governments.7 3
If the zoning enabling statutes are unambiguous on their face as the Lanvale
Court held,74 then the broad construction statutes may never be applied to
zoning ordinances unless it "is necessary to give effect to 'any powers that
are reasonably expedient to [a county's] exercise of the power.'"75 In light
of the Lanvale court reducing its analysis of the entire APFO under this test
to a single footnote,7 6 there is little guidance upon which courts can pro-
ceed. Against the post-Lanvale backdrop, the Patmore case appeared.n
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Misapplying Lanvale
Due to the similarities between Lanvale and Patmore, the court in Pat-
more was uniquely situated to answer questions left by Lanvale.7 ' While
Patmore involved a municipality and Lanvale involved a county, the dele-
gations of zoning authority and the broad construction statutes for munici-
palities and counties are nearly identical.79 Both Lanvale and Patmore in-
volved ordinances adopted purportedly under the general zoning powers
delegated to local governments.so In both cases, the ordinances purported to
regulate in a manner not explicitly authorized by the language of the ena-
bling statutes.81 Accordingly, both ordinances required implied authoriza-
tion in order to be valid ordinances. It is no surprise then that the plaintiffs
in Patmore argued, under Lanvale, Chapel Hill lacked authority to enact the
73. Id. ("The ruling in Lanvale seems to create a rule for North Carolina that is even narrower than
Dillon's Rule.").
74. Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d at 808.
75. Id. at 810 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4).
76. Id. at 808-8 10.
77. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d 302.
78. Id.; Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d 800.
79. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d 302; Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d 800. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-38 1(a)
(2013) ("For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community,
any city may adopt zoning and development regulation ordinances."), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383
(2013) ("Zoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public hcalth, safety, and general wel-
fare . . . ."), and N.C.GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2013) ("the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters
shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supple-
mcntary powers that arc reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect."),
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a) ("For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare, a county may adopt zoning and development regulation ordinances."), N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 153A-341 (2013) ("Zoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and
general welfare .... ), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2013) ("the provisions of this Chapter and of
local acts shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that
arc reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power.").
80. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d 302; Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d 800.
81. Parnore, 757 S.E.2d 302; Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d 800.
9
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ordinance at issue. 82 However, apparently in an effort to avoid the issue
altogether, the N.C. Court of Appeals grossly misapplied Lanvale.
In Patmore, the N.C. Court of Appeals reduced the entire Lanvale deci-
sion to a distinction between zoning and subdivision ordinances. The
court reasoned that the N.C. Supreme Court only struck down the ordinance
in Lanvale because it did not technically qualify as a zoning ordinance.84 As
the ordinance at issue in Patmore was distinpished as a zoning ordinance,
the court posited that Lanvale did not apply. 5 While it is true this was one
of the grounds on which the Supreme Court based its decision in Lanvale, it
is patently false to state this was the only aspect of the Lanvale holding.86 In
the portions of the Lanvale opinion relating to judicial interpretation of lo-
cal zoning authority, the language explicitly states that the Court's decision
is part of the holding.87 Yet, despite that, the N.C. Court of Appeals inexpli-
cably held the Lanvale Court "did not address a local government's authori-
ty to enact a bonafide zoning ordinance."88 The plaintiffs in Patmore spe-
cifically addressed their argument towards an extensive portion of the Lan-
vale decision. 9 Yet the court reached the curious conclusion that this vast
section of the opinion was simply dicta.90 If there was any room for doubt
over this, the Supreme Court removed it in King v. Town of Chapel Hill
when citing to Lanvale as a controlling authority on the application of the
broad construction statutes.9 '
Even if the N.C. Court of Appeals was correct in its statement that Lan-
vale, "did not change the law governing the requirements for a valid zoning
ordinance,"9 Lanvale would still stand as confirmation of the law which-
was somewhat crudely stated in Smith Chapel.3 That narrower approach to
judicial interpretation is precisely what the plaintiffs were requesting.94
Thus, the court should have examined the ordinance under the judicial
analysis espoused in Smith Chapel and clarified in Lanvale. Instead, the
court attempted to dodge the issue by focusing on a different aspect of the
82. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d at 308.
83. Id. at 308-09.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d 800.
87. Id. at 808-10 ("Accordingly, we must ascertain whether the plain language of our enabling
statutes gives the County implied authority to enact its APFO. We hold that it does not.").
88. Patnore, 757 S.E.2d at 309.
89. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 13-20, Patmorc v. Town of Chapel Hill, 757 S.E.2d 302
(2014) (No. COAl3-1049), 2013 WL 5776872.
90. Patnore, 757 S.E.2d at 308-09.
91. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 758 S.E.2d 364, 369 (N.C. 2014).
92. Patmore, 757 S.E.2d at 303.
93. See supra text accompanying note 66.
94. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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Lanvale holding.9 5 Distinguishing between zoning ordinances and subdivi-
sion ordinances would only have been helpful had the ordinance in Patmore
clearly failed to qualify as a zoning ordinance, in which case it would be
void under Lanvale. However, with that not being the case, the court erred
by not proceeding to analyze the ordinance under the applicable portion of
the Lanvale holding.
B. Applying Lanvale
It is unclear whether the court of appeals simply misinterpreted Lanvale,
or sought to avoid the issue altogether. After all, Lanvale is a complicated
case that did little to simplify the delineation between state and local gov-
ernment authority. What is unfortunate with Patmore is that it presented
an opportunity to shed light on the questions left unanswered by Lanvale,
but that opportunity was squandered.
After all, the N.C. Supreme Court, in Lanvale, held that the statutes
granting counties general zoning powers were unambiguous on their face.
As stated above, this conclusion calls into question any zoning regulations
that are not explicitly authorized by statute,98 which is exactly the case in
Patmore.99 The county in Lanvale was expressly authorized to enact zoning
ordinances regulating the "use of buildings, structures, and land for trade,
industry, residence, or other purposes,"'0 0 as well as "the efficient and ade-
quate provision of schools."'o' In Patmore, Chapel Hill was expressly au-
thorized to enact zoning ordinances regulating "overcrowding of land ...
undue concentration of population . .. [and] congestion in the
streets."l 02Since the broad construction statutes cannot be applied to these
express grants of authority, can Chapel Hill's amendment in Patimore regu-
lating parking on private property be said to have any less of a tenuous rela-
tionship to the language of the enabling statutes than Cabarrus County's
APFO in Lanvale?
The statutes do not expressly mention limiting parking on private proper-
ty any more than the statutes mention conditioning development approval
on adequate public school facilities. In fact, proponents would support the
95. See supra text accompanying note 1.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 70-73.
97. See supra text accompanying note 63.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
99. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 758 S.E.2d 364, 370 (N.C. 2014) (holding that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A- 174 (2013), delegating to cities the general powers to enact ordinances, was "by its very nature
ambiguous, and its reach cannot be fully defined in clear and definite terms.").
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a) (2013).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341 (2013).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (2013).
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idea that in light of N.C. Gen. Stat § 153A-34 1's provision for adequate
provision of schools, 0 3 that the APFO possessed more apparent authority
than Chapel Hill's parking ordinance. As parking is not explicitly men-
tioned in the statutes, the broad construction necessary to authorize Chapel
Hill's parking ordinance would only apply if it is "reasonably necessary or
expedient."'1 Is Chapel Hill's ordinance more "reasonably necessary or
expedient" than Cabarrus County's APFO?" How can a court properly de-
cide when an ordinance is reasonably necessary or expedient? These are the
questions that Lanvale left unanswered. Moreover, these are questions that
Patmore failed to address.
For instance, as the state's population continues to rise, counties like
Cabarrus County are facing an increasingly urgent problem of finding the
necessary funding for educational facilities. 0 5 Yet, even as the majority in
Lanvale admitted that the county's APFO was an effective solution, the
majority also refused to factor a potential population increase into the single
footnote discussion of whether the ordinance was "reasonably expedi-
ent.', 06 On the other hand, Chapel Hill's ordinance addressed some surplus
garbage and traffic in one neighborhood. 107 However, does this mention of
garbage and traffic pass the "reasonably expedient" test where Cabarrus
County's APFO failed?
Had the Court of Appeals in Patmore analyzed Chapel Hill's authority to
adopt the zoning amendment under the approach from Lanvale, it is entirely
possible that it would have held the amendment to be a valid exercise of
Chapel Hill's general zoning power. While the ordinances in both cases
have similarities that necessitate implied authority in order to be valid, there
are a myriad of differences upon which the court could have distinguished
the cases and reasonably upheld the Patmore ordinance under a Lanvale
analysis. 08 For instance, the fact that the General Assembly expressly
granted Chatham and Orange Counties the authority to enact impact fees,
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4.
105. See Michael F. Rocsslcr, Public Education, Local Authority, and Democracy: The
Implied Power of North Carolina Counties to Impose School Impact Fees, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 239,
240-41 (2011) ("North Carolina is experiencing steady and substantial population growth, particularly
in urban and suburban parts of the state .... As a result, public schools serving fast-growing communi-
tics have seen their facilities pushed far beyond capacity.") (footnotes omitted); See also Lanvale Prop-
erties, LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 731 S.E.2d 800, 828 (Hudson, J., dissenting) ("Finally, the majority
opinion ignores the increasingly desperate situation of many county governments in North Carolina,
which arc faced with rising populations, diminishing state funding for schools, and already burdensome
property taxes. These county governments will be, by the majority's opinion, deprived of an innovative
but statutorily authorized tool to help meet their constitutional obligations regarding education.").
106. Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d at 810, 814 n.8 (majority opinion).
107. See supra text accompanying note 8.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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while refusing Union County the same authority on three occasions, could
demonstrate legislative intent that express authority is required for impact
fees.1 09 In fact, courts have historically been more likely to interpret local
authority narrowly when it comes to taxes and fees.1 o Unfortunately, the
Lanvale holding struck down, not only the impact fees, but the entire APFO
as well."' Whether or not the Court in Lanvale erred by not severing the
impact fees from the APFO," 2 the broad holding of Lanvale is regrettably
the current law in North Carolina - law that the court in Patmore avoided
at all cost. Whether the Patmore court would ultimately have held the ordi-
nance to be void or valid, the specific grounds for such a decision would
have been enlightening.
V. CONCLUSION
In Patmore, the N.C. Court of Appeals faced an opportunity to shed light
on the lingering uncertainty regarding judicial interpretation of local zoning
authority left in the wake of Lanvale. However, the court inexplicably ig-
nored a vital swathe of the Lanvale holding and issued a decision that at-
tempted to simply avoid the issue entirely. The holding may have been a
boon for Chapel Hill who was spared from having to defend its ordinance
under the analysis of Lanvale. Nonetheless, such a gross misinterpretation
of a landmark case can only lead to more uncertainty and the fear of unpre-
dictable results in the future. Any guesses as to why the Supreme Court
denied the resulting petition for discretionary review would only amount to
speculation, but the denial of an opinion as off base as Patmore seems like-
ly to only delay the issue for a time. When the next local zoning ordinance
relying on implied authority comes up on appeal, the outcome is anyone's
guess.
109. See supra text accompanying note 56.
110. See Lan vale, 731 S.E.2d at 809 (explaining that Dillon's Rule was applied more stringently
regarding taxes and fees) (citing David F. Owens, LAND USE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 22-23 (2d ed.
2011)). See also David F. Owens, School Impact Fees and Development Regulations: Another Round,
COATES' CANONS: NC LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (Oct. 16'h 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6882
(positing that specific statutory authority is still required for taxes and fees).
I ll. Lanvale, 731 S.E.2d at 811.
112. See id. at 819-20 (Hudson, J., dissenting) ("By failing to scver the VMP provision, the majori-
ty appears to have created a situation in which the county is powerless to delay or deny development
applications in light of inadequate school capacity, and now has few choices beyond raising property
taxes on existing residents to pay for schools that will serve the new residents who move into the new
development."); Harder, supra note 4 (arguing that severance was proper).
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